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ACADEMIC FREEDOM-ITS BASIC PHILOSOPHY,
FUNCTION, AND HISTORY
RALPH F. FuCHS*
I
THE ScoPE oF AcADnMIc Finom
Academic freedom is that freedom of members of the academic community,
assembled in colleges and universities, which underlies the effective performance of
their functions of teaching, learning, practice of the arts, and research. The right
to academic freedom is recognized in order to enable faculty members and stu-
dents to carry on their roles. It is not sought as a personal privilege, although
scholars enjoy the activities it permits,1 and the tenure rights of faculty members,
which are conferred after a period of probation, bestow economic security as well
as forestall restrictions on freedom that might stem from the power to dismiss.
In relation to tenure the position of the faculty member resembles that of the judge
who holds office during good behavior to safeguard his fearlessness and objectivity
in the performance of his duties?
The conception of academic freedom which is dominant in colleges and universi-
ties in the United States today rests mainly on three foundations:
(i) the philosophy of intellectual freedom, which originated in Greece, arose
again in Europe, especially under the impact of the Renaissance, and came
to maturity in the Age of Reason;
(2) the idea of autonomy for communities of scholars, which arose in the univer-
sities of Europe; and
(3) the freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights of the federal constitution
as elaborated by the courts.
Academic tenure is protected by procedural safeguards in proceedings to dismiss
faculty members for cause, which are academically maintained and modelled to a
significant extent on procedural due process of law? Academic freedom, in addi-
*A.B., LL.B. 1922, Washington University; Ph.D. 1925, Robert Brookings Graduate School; J.S.D.
1935, Yale University. Professor of Law, Indiana University. President, American Association of Uni-
versity Professors, i96o-62.
The definition in the first sentence of Part I and the first paragraph of Part II of this article are largely
quoted, with the kind permission of the publishers of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, from the author's
article on Academic Freedom in the current edition of the Encyclopaedia, I ENcyc. BrT. 57 (1963).
The bibliography attached to that article contains additional references on the subject.
'Academic Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for National Security, Report of a Special Committee,
42 BULLETIN OF TE A ERUCAN ASsOCIATION OF UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS [hereinafter cited as A.A.U.P-
BULL.] 51, 54-55 (X956).
' Machlup, On Some Misconceptions Concerning Academic Freedom, 41 A.A.U.P. BULL. 753 (1955).
' Rudimentary procedural safeguards are required by the 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic
Freedom and Tenure, drafted and supported by educational organizations and published at intervals by
the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). See 46 A.A.U.P. BULL. 410 (i960) for the
text and a list of supporting organizations, to which several large scholarly associations have since been
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tion, has its correlative in academic responsibility in the use of freedom, which there
may or may not be recognized means of enforcing against faculty members.
Student freedom is a traditional accompaniment to faculty freedom as an element
of academic freedom in the larger sense; but in the United States it has on the whole
received secondary consideration until recendy. Now students are organized to
some extent to assert their right to it,' and recent court decisions have enforced
procedural protections, based on due process of law, against dismissals by state
institutions on account of student exercise of off-campus rights of free speech and
assembly.'
Exclusion from the academic community because of race has, also, been stated of
late to be a violation of academic freedom;' and exclusion of students or teachers
from public institutions on this ground or discrimination against them for this
reason, is, of course, a violation of federal constitutional rightY Choice of those who
shall participate in higher education (which must be an institutional choice) is, along
with determination of curricula and of areas of research, among the elements of that
academic autonomy which is one of the bases of academic freedom and may be
looked upon as its essence. ' It is, however, itself subject to constitutional require-
added. Institutional regulations provide specific procedural rules to a varying extent. See C.ARi BysE &
Louis Jouossm, TENtRE IN AMERICAN HIoHER EDUCATION (1959), for the results of a three-state survey of
such regulations. A model set of regulations is provided in Recommended Institutional Regulations on
Academic Freedom and Tenure, approved by the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the
AAUP on August 4, 1957, and published in mimeographed form by the Association. In discussions of
academic procedural problems, legal due process of law is often referred to.
'See Academic Freedom and Tenure: The University of Illinois, 49 A.A.U.P. BULL. 25 (1963), for
a discussion of the question whether a faculty member's alleged breach of responsibility in public utterance
can be a basis of disciplinary proceedings against him.
'Teacher freedom and student freedom, Lehrfreiheit and Lernireiheit, are companion concepts. In
Europe the freedom of students to visit other institutions and to govern their own personal conduct is
much wider on the whole than in this country. Here the idea has contributed to the policy of elective
courses; but no generally recognized code of student freedom has arisen. See RICHARD HoFSTADrER &
WALTER P. METZoER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREEDOMs 1N THE UNITED STATES 383-98 (1955).
0 The United States National Student Association, composed of the student bodies of nearly 400 college&
and universities, the student governments of which have adhered to the organization, devotes a considerable
portion of its attention to academic freedom and in particular to student freedom. See its CooiFICATIoN
OF POLICY esp. 28-29, 38-41, 97-X12 (1962-63). See also Am. Civil Liberties Union, Academic Freedom,
and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and Universities (g6i), reprinted in 48 A.A.U.P. BULL. aio.
(1962).
I Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d X50 (5 th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S,
930 (I96I); Knight v. State Board of Education, 2oo F. Supp. 174 (M.D. Tenn. x961). Like some
earlier cases, the opinions support rights to due procedure in connection with dismissals for any kind of
misconduct. See Byse, Procedure in Student Dismissal Proceedings: Law and Policy, 4 J. COLLEGE
STUDENT PERSONNEL 130 (1963).
'Resolution of the Forty-third Annual Meeting, 43 A.A.U.P. BULL. 362 (957): "The right to teach
and the right to learn are vital and inseparable aspects of academic freedom. Consequently, free access
to every kind of educational opportunity, measured only by the aptitude and achievement of the'
individual teacher or student, must be safeguarded to all Americans, of whatever race. Any interference
with such access imperils the right of the teacher to teach, as well as of the student to learn."
'Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Alston.
v. School Board of Norfolk, 112 F.2d 99z (4 th Cir. 1940); Davis v. Cook, 8o F. Supp. 443 (N.D. Ga.
1948). Cf. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, at 100 (1947).
10 Lennard, The Threat to Academic Freedom, Hibbert Journal, Oct- 1948, p. 21. Robert M. Maclver'
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ments, which may on occasion protect the individual student or faculty member from
action by his institution as well as by outsiders1
Inroads upon autonomy in respect to research are a leading cause of concern in
American colleges and universities at present, because grants from government and
industry for designated projects may influence the directions of inquiry. Here insti-
tutional integrity and individual self-direction both stand in need of protection-not
from hostile action but from temptation.'
Notwithstanding the increasingly broad reach of academic freedom and the
current emphasis on the essentiality of autonomy for academic institutions, the
freedom of individual faculty members against control of thought or utterance from
either within or without the employing institutions remains the core of the matter.
If this freedom exists and reasonably adequate academic administration and methods
of faculty selection prevail, intellectual interchange and pursuit of knowledge are
secured. A substantial degree of institutional autonomy is both a usual prerequisite
and a normal consequence of such a state of affairs. Student freedom will follow-
unless, indeed, individual faculty members or departmental groups are permitted
to tyrannize over particular students, as occasionally happens. Hence the main
concern over developing and maintaining academic freedom in this country has
focused upon encouragement and protection of the freedom of the faculty member.
Institutional autonomy, constitutional freedoms, and the basic ideology of in-
tellectual freedom have been invoked mainly to this end.
II
DEVELOPMENT OP ACADEMIC FREEDOM
European universities began during the Middle Ages as self-constituted com-
munities of scholars, whether teachers or learners. The institutions they founded
in his book, ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN Ou TIME (1955), stresses the autonomy of the faculty within an
institution in matters lying within its competence as basic to academic freedom. See especially pp. 94-95.
RUSSELL KIRx, ACADEMIC FREEnoM (955), stresses the inherent right of the academic community
to maintain its own standards in that search for truth which is its reason for being.
" The AAUP Annual Meeting resolution, supra note 8, asserts that individual rights to teach and
to learn are superior to restriction by any authority on ground of race; and of course judicial judgments
which strike down segregation in education are typically directed against educational authorities. If the
policy which excludes a student or faculty member is based on such allowable grounds as competence
or prior training, or perhaps age or sex, the right to maintain it might be claimed as an incident to
institutional academic freedom. In Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245
(1934), the Regents' policy of excluding male students who would not submit to compulsory military
training was sustained; but in Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), the policy of
requiring a salute to the flag (in an elementary school) had to yield to the right of pupils who refused
to take part and whose parents would be punished for their non-attendance at school if they were expelled
for refusing.
22 See AMERICAN COUNCIL ON EDUCATION, CoMmrraE ON RESEARCH POLICY, REPORT ON SPONSORED
REIEARCH POLICY OF COLLEOES AND UNIVERSITIES (954); Am. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, STATEMENT
CONCERNING THE UNIVERSITY AND CONTRACT RESEARCH (1959), reprinted in 46 A.A.U.P. BULL. 52 (1960);
HARVARD AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: A REPORT TO THE FACULTIES AND GOVERNING BoARDs OF
HARVARD UNIVERSITY (196i); Twenty-six Campuses and the Federal Government, 46 EDUCATIONAL RECORD
95, 108-13 (r963); Gosheen, Federal Financing and Princeton University, id. at 168.
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came under the sponsorship of the medieval church and to some degree under its
authority; and the faculties, of course, were composed largely of clerics. Before the
eighteenth century the Roman church and in some areas its protestant successors
exerted sporadic controls against which the universities or members of their faculties
found it necessary at times to contend. Scholars outside of the universities, in-
cluding early scientists, engaged in the same struggles, however, and the total story
is one of the effort of the human intellect to escape from bondage, rather than
simply of university faculties and students to be free of external control. Within
the universities a considerable censorship by dominant groups, giving rise to internal
controversies, prevailed for a long time. The boundaries to learning maintained
by this censorship receded on the whole, even though vestiges remained for long.'3
At Oxford and Cambridge religious tests and restrictions for students were not
removed until the latter half of the nineteenth century.' 4
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the political state became the sponsoring
authority for most universities throughout the world-although some under religious
auspices remained and in the United States particularly independent private colleges
and universities have continued to exist alongside the public ones. Instances of
actual or attempted political interference with public institutions have continued to
arise in various countries down to the present time.' In the United States political
control by state governments remains a danger which assumes reality under dema-
gogic governors from time to time,'" despite the generally good record of the states
in relation to the colleges and universities they maintain. In Europe dictatorships
of several varieties have supplied object-lessons of the extent to which political control
can regiment and distort intellectual endeavor even while stimulating the develop.
ment of learning along selected lines.' In some other countries, political influence
15 HoFsTADT'rr. & METZGER, op. cit. supra note 5, ch. I.
14 Id. at 393.
25 For examples of successful resistance to attempts of this kind in the face of strong traditions of
academic freedom, see instances reported in RcARD H. SHYROcK, THE STATUS OF UNIVERSITY TEACHERS
77 (France) and 159 (Egypt) (published by Int'l Ass'n of Univ. Professors and Lecturers, xg6).
In India the interaction of administrations, faculty groups, students, and state officials, each invoking political
forces in varying degree, gives rise to government intervention from time to time, as it did in the univer-
sities of Uttar Pradesh in I96O-6X.
"
8 The latest of the interventions of this variety was that of the Governor of Mississippi in the crisis
over admission of a Negro to the University there in September-October 1962, followed by a similar
attempt in Alabama. For the response in educational circles, see Resolution adopted by the American
Council on Education, Oct. 5, 1962, 44 EDUCATIONAL REoR 85 (x963), also printed in 48 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 318 (1962). An earlier Mississippi episode involving gubernatorial assumption of the control
of state institutions is told about in Hudson, The Spoils System Enters College, 64 NEw R PVun. 123
(1930). For the actions of educational organizations in the matter, see 17 A.A.U.P. BULL. x40 (93i).
As to the control of Louisiana State University by Governor Huey P. Long a few years later, see Don
Wharton, Louisiana State University, Scribner's Magazine, Sept. 1937, P 33. State coercion of private
colleges appears in Academic Freedom and Tenure: Allen University and Benedict College, 46 A.A.U.P.
BULL. 87 (ig6o).
""'The control of fascism over the universities is exemplified by conditions which continue in Spain.
See the account by Professor Tierno Galvan in Simyoox, op. cit. supra note 15, at X33. For an account
of tight Communist Party control over institutions of higher education in Russia, see I. N. SHUmLmN,
SOVIET HIGHER EDUCATION ch. VI (1962).
BASIC PHILOSOPHY, FUNCTION, AND HISTORY 435
may play a significant although unmeasurable role in the appointment of staff
members. There is a genuine interaction between academic freedom and healthy
political democracy, causing each to strengthen the other. It would be too much
to say, however, that the former is wholly dependent upon the latter; for given en-
lightenment on the part of an autocratic government, academic freedom in a genuine
sense may coexist with it, as it did in nineteenth century Germany.' 8
It was, indeed, in nineteenth century Germany that the modern conception of
academic freedom came to be formulated. The idea of the university as a place where
scholars are to pursue truth, as well as to formulate and transmit it to students, who
at the same time learn to pursue truth for themselves, came to be dominant there.
Especially in an age of science, knowledge grows as individuals ferret it out; and the
free interplay of ideas is the means of purifying it. Intellectual discipline over the
members of the university community is excluded, lest it distort their search.
Attracted by this conception and its results, distinguished young scholars from
abroad, especially from the United States, went to the German universities in
numbers.:9 There they were imbued with the conception, an enlargement of which
has since been dominant in this country.
Professor Friedrich Paulsen of the University of Berlin formulated systematically
in 19o2, in his book on The German Universities and University Study, the concep-
tion of academic freedom which had arisen in his country during the preceding
decades. "It is no longer, as formerly," he wrote,"
the function of the university teacher to hand down a body of truth established by
authorities, but to search after scientific knowledge by investigation, and to teach his
hearers to do the same. . . . For the academic teacher and his hearers there can be no
prescribed and no proscribed thoughts. There is only one rule for instruction: to justify
the truth of one's teaching by reason and the facts.
Paulsen, however, introduced a qualification. The professor of philosophy must
be absolutely free; but the professor of theology "must assume a positive relation
to religion and the church in general," and the professor of political and social science
in a state institution must do so toward "the people and the state." The professor
"who can find absolutely no reason in the state and in law, who, as a theoretical
anarchist, denies the necessity of a state and legal order ... may try to prove his
theory by means of as many good arguments as he can, but he has no call to teach
the political sciences at a state institution." The state, for example, is not bound
to tolerate adherence to the "principles of the social-democracy" on the part of
professors of political science. To permit such theories to be taught would indicate
that "the authorities regarded the lectures of professors as harmless and in-
significant... . So long as the state takes the universities seriously, such a form
1 8 HoFsADTER & METzGERt, op. cit. supra note 5, at 383-92.
'o Rockwell, Academic Freedom-German Origin and American Development, 36 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 225
(195o); Metzger, The German Contribution to the American Theory of Academic Freedom, 4 id. 214
(955).
"°Translation by F. Thilly and W. W. Elwang (z9o6), pp. 228-31.
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of political science as has been described will be impossible in its institutions of
learning."'.
Paulsen also expressed the view that political partisanship on the part of a
faculty member is a disqualification, notwithstanding the fact that professors may
be "men of noble discontent" who sow "the thoughts for future acts." The things
which universities "are called upon to cultivate transcend the boundaries of countries
and nations. ... The German universities dwell in their own world, outside of
politics, and their highest achievements are in science." Hence the professors, "the
representatives of science, should not engage in politics, but should reflect upon
the state and the law."22 Academic freedom, in other words, is internal to institutions
of higher education, and does not apply to external activities of academic personne. 3
The conception of academic freedom which is dominant in American colleges
and universities and in other countries today has discarded the limitations that re-
mained in nineteenth century Germany. It accepts, rather, another statement of
Paulsen's that "a people," who establish and maintain a university,2
cannot as such have an interest in the preservation of false conceptions. Its ability to live
depends in no small measure upon its doing that which is necessary from a proper
knowledge of actual conditions. And hence the people and the state ...can have no
desire to place obstacles in the way of an honest search for truth in the field of politics
and social science, either by forbidding or favoring certain views.
It follows that a society will be strengthened by permitting honest condemnation
as well as defense of the state in institutions of higher learning, whether publicly or
privately maintained. As to participation by professors in politics, specialization
and attention to duty will ordinarily keep the faculty member from an active role;
but he cannot be barred from testing his views or gathering data in action, or from
urging his conclusions in the world of affairs, whether relevant to his academic
subject or not, by joining organizations or by other means. In addition to "full
freedom" in research and publication and "freedom in the classroom in discussing
his subject," the faculty member in any field of study, speaking or writing as a
citizen, "should be free from institutional censorship or discipline."2' 5
According to the position taken by some Americans within the academic pro-
fession and outside who subscribe to broad principles of academic freedom, certain
specific limitations upon that freedom may nevertheless be imposed for reasons of
special urgency. During World War I some of the staunchest proponents of
academic freedom sanctioned the muzzling of anti-war professors and even of those
21 1d. at 233-38, 243-54.
d21. at 254-62.
'
5 The German university tradition involved a sharp separation between the academic community
and the general one, with the former devoted to science and philosophy and hence "utterly indifferent
to the turmoils and ambitions of the outer-world." See excerpts from JAMEs MoRo HART, GERMAN
UNivE-srIEs: A NARRATivE OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE (874), as printed in 2 RICHARD HOFSArDTER &
WuLSON SMITH, A.MERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 569, 576 (I96x).
"'Paulsen, supra note 20, at 244.
1S 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 3.
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whose ancestry and utterances gave "reasonable ground for belief that they contem-
plate[d]" acts to aid the enemy or hamper the war effort.2 0 Many today and
during the past thirty years have urged that membership in the Communist Party
disqualifies an individual for faculty membership without reference to sincerity or
circumstances, because of the Party's discipline and the existence of a basic conflict
between its purposes and freedom itself 27 The professional charter of academic
freedom which is currently followed concedes more generally that a college or
university may insist upon "limitations of academic freedom because of religious
or other aims of the institution," provided the limits are clearly stated in advance.
8
This concession recognizes the church sponsorship of many institutions in this
country and the civil liberty of individuals and groups, including those who form
academic institutions, to govern their own affairs. At some point in the scale of self-
imposed restrictions a college or university that comes under them may, of course,
cease to be an institution of higher education according to the prevailing conception;
2 9
and an institution that does not expressly limit itself assumes an obligation to adhere
to the principles inherent in an academic community. As generally understood
today, these principles do not sanction the proscription of any ideas or honest means
of communicating or effectuating them, on the part of academic personnel, within
an institution or outside.
The present American conception of academic freedom did not, of course, spring
full-blown from the soil in which higher education grew in this country. It evolved,
rather, along with specific protections to academic freedom, from the organizational
forms and educational policies that arose in colleges and universities, and from
struggles over recurring infringements of freedom or tenure, which sometimes took
the form of faculty dismissals. These infringements were committed by governing
boards or administrative officers, moved in the typical case by opinion outside the
institutions, which the institutional authorities ordinarily shared. At first the
pressures that resulted in these incidents were the product of demands for religious
conformity; 30 later they involved objections to the economic or political views of
2 A.A.U.P. Bulletin, Fcb.-March I918, pp. 29, 41.
' ASSOCIATION OF AmERiCAN UNIVERSITIES, THE RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF UNIVERSITIES AND
THEIR FACULTIES Pt. IV (1953); Lovejoy, Communism Versus Academic Freedom, i8 AmERICAN SCHOLAR
332 (1949); Sidney Hook, Should Communists Teach?, N.Y. Times Magazine, Feb. 27, 1949, P. 7; KIEK,
op. cit. supra note so, at 114-15. Compare Alexander Meiklejohn, Should Communists Teach?, N.Y.
Times Magazine, Mar. 27, 1959, P. io; and see Hook & Fuchs, A Joint Statement on a Matter of Im-
portance, 42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 692 (956). For brief accounts of events at the University of Washington
and the University of California which followed the implementation by those institutions of the policy
of barring Communist Party members from the faculties, see 42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 61-66, 100-107 (1956).
28 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 3.
"The Declaration of Principles formulated in 1915 by the first Committee on Academic Freedom
and Tenure of the AAUP distinguished in this regard between "proprietary institutions" espousing particular
ideas and those which exercise a "public trust" and "have no moral right to bind the reason or the
conscience of any professor." Reprinted in 40 A.A.U.P. BULL. 90, 94-97 0954).
I" HOFSTADTER & METzwGE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 155-77, 286-303, 320-45. Views on slavery which
were out of accord with those in the academic or surrounding community were also the cause of dis-
missals or of hostility to individual administrators or faculty members. Id. at 253-61.
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faculty members31 Most recently, nonconforming utterances in matters of sex, or
literary works which have been deemed offensive, have produced faculty dismissals
raising issues of freedomf 2
III
PROFESSIONAL FORMULATION AND SUPPORT OF PRINCIPLES OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Because of concern among professors over dismissals that had taken place, coupled
with the belief that it would be desirable to have a national organization of college
and university teachers similar to the associations of physicians and lawyers, the
American Association of University Professors (AAUP) was formed in x9I5 by a
group of prominent faculty members in leading institutions. Those who joined as
charter members came from sixty institutions. Although the purposes of the new
Association were broadly professional, its most noteworthy early pronouncement
was the 1915 Declaration of its Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure,
specifically directed to that subject 33 The officers of the Association quickly became
absorbed in efforts to cope with recurring dismissals of faculty members at institutions
in various parts of the country.84 The Association has continued in conjunction
with the Association of American Colleges (AAC) to formulate basic principles
of academic freedom and tenure.35 It has also provided means of vindicating these
principles by directing professional attention to academic administrations which are
found to have violated them,"0 and has spelled out its policies in decisions on particu-
lar cases and in annual reports of the Committee on Freedom and Tenure, carrying
forward the 1915 Declaration.
81 Id. ch. IX.
"
2Academic Freedom and Tenure: The University of Illinois, supra note 4; Academic Freedom
and Tenure: Southwestern Louisiana Institute, 42 A.A.U.P. BULL. 78 (x956). Instances of dismissal
on account of publication of literary works have been the subject of recent complaint to the AAUP.
Another recent factor contributing to violations of freedom and tenure has been, of course, a wave of
dismissals from institutions in the Deep South because of views or utterances in favor of racial
desegregation. For recent summaries, see 48 A.A.U.P. BuLL. at 159 and z67-69 (1962). As to the in-
timidating effect of the climate of opinion in which southern institutions operate today, see Woodward,
The Unreported Crisis in the Southern Colleges, Harper's, Oct. 1962, p. 82.
83 1915 Declaration of Principles, supra note 29.
"
4 Metzger, The First Investigation, 47 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 206 (i96s).
8 5The two associations formulated a joint statement in 1925, now superseded by the 1940 Statement.
See 1925 Conference Statement, 43 A.A.U.P. BuLL. sx6 (1957). A joint Statement on Procedural
Standards in Dismissal Proceedings received final approval in 1957-58. 44 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 270
(1958).
8These means typically consist of an on-the-scene inquiry by a special committee of professors into
a challenged dismissal that has not been resolved by negotiation, the publication of its report after approval
for publication by the Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure of the Association, "censure" of the
responsible administration (including governing board) where deemed warranted by the Council and
an Annual Meeting of the Association, and subsequent negotiations looking to removal of the censure.
The list of censured administrations, which originated in 1938 as a substitute for previous removals of
institutions from an "eligible list," is regularly published in the Bulletin. See, e.g., 49 A.A.U.P. BuLL.
4 (i963).
- These reports are published in the Bulletin after their presentation at Annual Meetings. See especially
the report for 1950, 37 A.A.U.P. Bus.. 72 (1951). The report of the Special Committee on Academic
Freedom and Tenure in the Quest for National Security, supra note x, reformulated the applicable general
principles with special reference to the issues presented by the national effort to combat communism.
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These group measures have involved only partial collaboration between the
professors, represented by their association, and administrators and trustees. The
AAC has shared in what might be called the legislative process; but mediation in
on-campus disputes, investigation into challenged dismissals, determinations of
whether violations of the principles of freedom and tenure have occurred, and the
application of sanctions have fallen to the AAUP acting alone. In its investigations,
reports, and use of sanctions, the Association prides itself on proceeding with
scrupulous objectivity through processes judicial in character. Its conclusions as to
facts have not been challenged, except very rarely by an immediate party.
In the reports it has been necessary to develop through interpretation the rather
brief joint statements which underlie the conclusions. As to tenure, for example,
the "acceptable academic practice" the i94o Statement sets forth, of limiting the
faculty member's probationary period to seven years, has been translated into a
mandatory ruleY8  With respect to academic freedom during the probationary
period, for which the i94o Statement provides, it has been held that the faculty
member may not be made to suffer non-renewal of his appointment or denial of
tenure because of his exercise of freedom3 9 The freedom of the faculty member to
speak as a citizen, which is secured "from institutional censorship or discipline," has
been taken to include his privilege of refusing on constitutional grounds to answer
questions in an official investigation.49 The judgment of unfitness to continue in a
faculty position, which may be reached in a dismissal proceeding, may not be based
merely on conduct, such as simple membership or honest activity in a suspected
organization, which is within the ambit of academic freedom 1 This type of de-
velopment of the principles of freedom and tenure, although ex parte, has implicitly
been accepted-in part, no doubt, because of the sheer necessity for it, and to some
extent, perhaps, because of the soundness of the interpretations reached.
The extent of the actual acceptance of these interpretations by the academic com-
munity as a whole cannot be gauged with precision. The decisions by the AAUP to
which they have led-and, indeed, the decisions establishing clear-cut violations of
explicit principles-have not secured the reinstatement of faculty members found
to have been wrongfully dismissed. The regulations of the offending institutions
have, however, typically been made to conform subsequently to the stated principles,
as those of many other institutions do, without dissent from the interpretations
of the AAUP.4 2
42 A.A.U.P. BuLL. at 50-61 (1956). A supplementary statement of the Committee on Academic Freedom
and Tenure was published in 1958. 44 A.A.U.P. BULL. 6 (1958).
s Academic Freedom and Tenure: Princeton Theological Seminary, 45 A.A.U.P. BULL. 47 (1959).
" Alabama Polytechnic Institute, 44 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 158 (1958); see also Academic Freedom and
Tenure: Evansville College, 35 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 74 (1949).
The Effects of Refusal to Testify, 42 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 75 (956).
"University of Washington, id. at 6x.
"The administration is not required to assent affirmatively to an interpretation which is disputable and
which does not have the approval of the Association of American Colleges, although it sometimes does
assent.
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Of central importance in the implementation of the principles of freedom and
tenure is the assurance of participation by faculty members in decisions when the
dismissal of colleagues is proposed. The 194o Statement provides that "termination
for cause of a continuous appointment, or the dismissal for cause of a teacher
previous to the expiration of a term appointment, should, if possible, be considered
by both a faculty committee and the governing board of the institution.' '4a Often
characterized as a means of securing a judgment of the faculty member by his
peers in the first instance, this provision draws its chief value from the assurance it
gives that academic considerations will enter into decisions and from the likelihood it
provides that professionally accepted principles will be given effect. Without such
faculty participation, the prospects for thoroughgoing maintenance of academic
freedom in American institutions of higher learning would be considerably less than
they are.
IV
LEGAL IMPAlEMENT AND PROTEION OF ACADEMIC FREEom
In addition to the contribution which constitutional law has made to the sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of academic freedom as professionally defined and
maintained, the law of the land may bear directly on academic freedom in at least
three ways: through the impairment of freedom by legislative restrictions on it;
through judicial enforcement of constitutional barriers to such impairments; and
through judicial protection of the right to freedom as against limitation by academic
authorities themselves. In rendering decisions in cases arising in any of these areas
the courts, especially the Supreme Court of the United States under the Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment, may do much to define the effective scope
of academic freedom.
Legislation which attaches ideological tests to the eligibility of students or
faculty to participate in higher education obviously impairs academic freedom by
imposing the alternative of either outward conformity or exclusion for refusal to
submit. Statutory oaths of allegiance aroused much opposition among administrators
and professors in the I93O'S.4 Even though the required oaths could be taken in
good faith and construed according to the subjective loyalties of the takers, they were
recognized as efforts to impose conformity on education!" These laws remain
on the books46 and have been augmented by a loyalty oath requirement that condi-
tions federal aid to students and scholars under the National Science Foundation and
National Defense Education Acts 7 There have also been added the more recent
A8 Note 3 supra.
"The index to volume 22 of the AAUP Bulletin (r936), under the caption "Loyalty Oaths," leads
to published accounts of protests against such oaths.
"'See Becker, In Support of the Constitution, 21 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 327 (r935), reprinted from 14o
TsM NATION 13 (1935); Angel, address to Yale Alumni, 22 A.A.U.P. BULL. 260 (936); Statement on
Freedom of Speech-Teachers' Oath Laws, 23 A.A.U.P. BuLL. (1937).
"'WALT.R GELLHORN, Tim STATES AND SUBVESbON 410-I (1952).
'764 Stat. 156, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § I874 (d)(i)(A) (Supp. x963); 72 Stat. x962, as amended,
2o U.S.C.A. § 581(f) (Supp. z963).
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requirements of disclaimers of subversive associations and beliefs, including such
a requirement in the same two federal acts prior to their amendment in I962.48 The
principal objections to such disclaimers are that they operate somewhat in terrorem
when their terms are not wholly clear and that the exclusion of any genuinely held
ideas whatsoever from colleges and universities is inconsistent with the nature of
higher education. In addition, they are invidious when academic personnel are
singled out for attention, and can lead easily to inquisitions when false swearing
is suspected.49 Similar in effect are statutory requirements for disclosure of
memberships, accompanied by express or implied threats of dismissal if unfavorable
affiliations are brought to light50 Statutes requiring investigations to ferret out
individuals adhering to proscribed organizations or beliefs operate with, if anything,
still more drastic effect.51 Simple prohibitions, enforceable by criminal prosecutions,
operate more sporadically. The one which has now replaced the disclaimer require-
ment in the National Science Foundation and National Defense Education Acts is
quite tightly drawn.5
Investigations not required by statute and having no prescribed effects under
existing law may nevertheless operate in terrorem and may lead to loss of reputation
by those who are subject to inquiry, if their beliefs and associations are gone into.
Therefore, the possible effect of such investigations in limiting the freedom of students
and faculty is recognized, and specific justification for each inquiry must be shown.53
When justification is shown and the inquiry goes forward, the restriction that may
result is a consequence of the conduct of academic institutions in society. Inquiry
4 8Notes 46 and 47, supra, prior to amendment. The requirement of the two acts was that
the affiant swear "he does not believe in, and is not a member of and does not support any organization
that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or violence or by any
illegal or unconstitutional methods."
" Among many published protests against the disclaimer affidavit requirement of the National
Defense Education Act, possibly the most eloquent and comprehensive is that written by President A.
Whitney Griswold of Yale University and published in the New York Times Magazine of December 20,
1959, at p. I8. For a record of opposition among educators, see Repealing the Disclaimer A4ffdavit, 46
A.A.U.P. BuLL. 55 (1960). For the result and a final list of protesting institutions, see Orentlicher, The
Disclaimer Affidavit: A Valedictory, 48 id. 524 (1962).
o See the Arkansas act involved in Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1g6o). Although the decision
invalidating the statute was placed on the ground of undue breadth of the required disclosure (infra
text at note 65), the legislature of the state was clearly seeking to provide a means of identifying members
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), and of discouraging mem-
bership in that organization. See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Bates v. Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (Ig6o); Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (g6i).
"' See Adler v. Board of Education, infra note 6x. The Association of American Law Schools
(AALS) condemned sweeping investigations into the loyalty of university faculties in a resolution adopted
in 195i, dealing also with other aspects of academic freedom in relation to national security. i951
PRoCEE.DINOS 61-62, 98-101. For comprehensive reports of the Association's Committee on Academic
Freedom and Tenure in this area, see id. 5O2-36; 1953 PRoczEDos 97-125; 1954 PROCEEDINGS 20-22,
115-20.
" Under the provision, it becomes a criminal offense for a knowing member of an organization which
is registered, or has been required by a final order of the Subversive Activities Control Board to register,
under the Internal Security Act, to apply for a federal loan or grant.
" Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); see Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigating
Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (x963).
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into the substance of the teaching in an institution seems, however, to be forbidden
on constitutional grounds0 4 The character and incidental activities of those who
participate in the educational process, in so far as they are deemed relevant to
national security, are, on the other hand, subject to scrutiny."
Judicial enforcement of constitutional barriers to the impairment of academic free-
dom by governmental action, centering in the Supreme Court of the United States,
has resulted in predominantly split decisions, falling now on one side of the line
separating validity from invalidity and then on the other." Most of the decisions
involving faculty members have not turned on issues related specifically to academic
affairs, but rather on such questions as whether a dismissal for past invocation
of the fifth amendment violated the personal rights of the individual,57 whether an
oath law might require dismissal from any kind of public employment because of
innocent membership in a proscribed organization,58 whether a mandatory oath was
invalidly vague in its terms, 9 or whether procedural due process was accorded in
a legislative investigation. 0 The permissible scope of governmental inquiries into
academic affairs and the permissible bases for excluding persons from teaching
positions have, however, been considered; and in the opinions to which these questions
have given rise the Justices of the Supreme Court have uttered formulations of
academic freedom that will be enduringly influential.
The leading case is Adler v. Board of Education,"' involving the Feinberg Law
of New York. The statute and regulations under it by the State Board of Regents
required the Board of Education of the city of New York to list organizations
found, after hearing, to advocate or teach overthrow of the Government by force or
violence or other unlawful means, and further required that persons teaching or ad-
vocating overthrow of the Government by these means, or knowingly belonging to
organizations so teaching or advocating, should not be appointed or retained as
teachers in public institutions. Hearings were to be accorded before denial of
appointment or dismissal under the law, with membership in an organization listed
by the Board constituting prima facie evidence of disqualification. The Supreme
Court sustained the statute in an opinion by Mr. Justice Minton which upholds the
authority of the state to exclude from the "sensitive area" of the schoolroom persons
5 Infra, text at note 63.
Barenblatt v. United States, infra note 64.
See Carr, Academic Freedom, the American Association of University Professors, and the United
States Supreme Court, 45 A.A.U.P. BULL. 5 (x959); Fuchs, The Rarenblatt Decision and the Academic
Profession, id. at 333 (1959). For a penetrating discussion of restrictions on the freedom of teachers
and the means of combating them, see Racial Integration and Academic Freedom, 34 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 725,
899 (1959) (Part one of a study by the Arthur Garfield I-lays Memorial Fund, School of Law, New York
University).
"' Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958); cf. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. i
(196o).
s Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
n Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (jo61)
'0 Sweezy v. New Hampsire, supra note 53-
61 342 U.S. 485 (1952)-
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of the kind proscribed. The Court cited a decision the preceding year, in which
a disclaimer oath requirement for Los Angeles municipal employees was upheld
on the ground that public servants may be examined "as to matters that may
prove relevant to their fitness and suitability for the public service." '62 Justices
Douglas and Black dissented, emphasizing the intimidation caused by such legisla-
tion and by the principle of guilt by association of which the New York statute made
use. "Where suspicion fills the air," said Mr. Justice Douglas, "and holds scholars
in line for fear of their jobs, there can be no exercise of the free intellect."
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire, the decision reached by four concurring Justices
turned in the end on a denial of due process through failure to show that the questions
asked of a visiting lecturer at the University of New Hampshire about his lectures
and party affiliations, during an official investigation, came within the authorized
scope of the inquiry. The opinion of these four Justices, by Chief Justice Warren,
expressed special concern over academic freedom. "The essentiality of freedom
in the community of American universities is almost self-evident," he wrote:0 3
No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who
guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders
in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of educa-
tion is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made.
Particularly is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted
as absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust.
Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate,
to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Here, "We believe that there unquestionably was an invasion of petitioner's liberties
in the areas of academic freedom and political expression-areas in which govern-
ment should be extremely reticent to tread."
The same view was elaborated in a concurring opinion by Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan, basing the decision on the freedom issue. As a result, in the later
Barenblatt case,64 the majority of the Court stated in an opinion by Mr. Justice
Harlan that,
... broadly viewed, inquiries cannot be made into the teaching that is pursued in any of our
educational institutions. When academic teaching-freedom and its corollary learning-
freedom, so essential to the well-being of the Nation, are claimed, this Court will always
be on the alert against intrusion by Congress into this constitutionally protected domain.
In the eyes of the Court majority in this case, however, the coercive effect of investiga-
tions into communist associations and activities of students and teachers is out-
weighed by the public interest in discovering such conduct, where there is reason
to suspect it. A broadscale disclosure of all organizational affiliations cannot, how-
ever, be required of teachers in public institutions.65
2 Garner v. Los Angeles Board of Public Works, 34X U.S. 716 (951).
as 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)-
Barenblatt v. United States, 36o U.S. iog, 112 (1959).
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (ig6o).
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On the frontier of legal protection to academic freedom lies the possible avail-
ability of judicial remedies to aggrieved faculty members or students against impair-
ment of their freedoms by actions of the institutions. Breach of contract, violation
of an applicable regulation of a public institution, or unconstitutional use of public
power (exercised by officers of a public institution as state officials or exercised by a
private institution pursuant to delegation) might be the basis of relief. The same
analysis as may justify recovery against violation of procedural or tenure rights"'
applies here; but the precise meaning of institutional documents securing the right
to freedom is often subject to considerable doubt. The Illinois Court of Appeals
has recently rejected a claim that institutional regulations securing faculty freedom
provided anything more than due consideration within the university of a claim
that freedom had been violated by a dismissal on account of a letter published in
the student newspaper. 7 Courts will be reluctant in any event to review the de-
terminations of academic authorities in such matters, and there is no strong demand
that they do so." Professional means of vindicating academic freedom against insti-
tutional action remain the chief reliance of faculties.
V
By WAY op SuMmARY
It should be apparent from even so brief an account as the one in the preceding
pages that academic freedom rests on a variety of cultural and institutional factors;
that it changes from time to time and from place to place; and that in the United
States today it embraces more sweeping claims to independence, as well as a vastly
greater range of educational activities, than ever before in history. Originating as
a condition of scholarly endeavor in institutions that performed highly specialized
functions closely related to philosophy, and restricted until recently to freedoms
within those institutions, it has been expanded in the United States to cover faculty
members in a great variety of institutions "beyond the high school,""9 and to protect
the liberty to participate in extramural as well as intramural activities. To render
this expanded academic freedom secure, impressive professional enforcement
machinery has been established and the law of the land has been invoked to a sig-
nificant extent.
"' See Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wash. 2d 1II, 361 P.2d 551 (i96r), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 436
(z962); Byse, Academic Freedom, Tenure, and the Law, 73 Hnv. L. REV. 304 (959).
" Koch v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 39 11. App.2d 51, 187 N.E.2d 340 (1962).
"Article 5(3) of the German Constitution reads: "Art and science, research and teaching, shall be
free. Freedom of teaching shall not absolve from loyalty to the constitution." Even so explicit a provision
might mean only that specified freedoms are guaranteed against interference by non-academic authority.
The self-government of academic institutions is included in the guaranty, and is secured as well by state
constitutional provisions. 3 ENTSCHEIDUNGFN DEs BUNDESVRFASSUNmGMSURC'rs 58, 143 (1953); 1
MAN OLDT-KLEN, DAS BoNNER GRUNDG.SETZ 253 (2d ed. 1957). It seems unlikely, therefore, that an
alleged denial of academic freedom by academic authority would be reached by the guaranty.
"' The German constitutional guaranty of teaching freedom (Leihrireiheit) is not deemed by com-
mentators to extend to instruction that does not depend upon independent investigation. Hence it is
confined to academic institutions and does not apply to those that prescribe the content of courses to be
taught or the textbooks to be used. I MANoLI-KLEIN. op. cit. supra note 68, at 257, 58.
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The same development as has produced teachers' colleges (now expanded to state
colleges and universities), engineering and business education, art institutes, "depart-
ment store universities," and many other forms of higher education in this country
has, of course, brought a far larger portion of the youth of the land into these
institutions as students than is or has been the case anywhere else. Popular concern
with what goes on there is correspondingly great. The operation of colleges and
universities is enmeshed in community affairs at many points. When to this factor
is added the direct and immediate dependence of public institutions and many private
ones on current appropriations, contributions, or tuition payments for support, the
difficulties besetting the maintenance of full academic freedom become apparent.
Also relevant is the form of organization of colleges and universities in this
country, which places them, with rare exceptions, legally under the control of lay
governing boards. It is this factor which, along with the delegated authority of
presidents and other administrators, accounts for the form-namely, contests over
the dismissals of faculty members from positions they hold legally as employees-
which academic freedom issues have assumed. It accounts, too, for the shape
which professional protective measures have taken, opposing faculty judgments
within an institution, or marshalled from outside by the national association of
faculty members, to those of the legally constituted authorities. Collaboration be-
tween employees and employed on a professional basis is growing, however.?'
At the same time, small beginnings have been made at holding in check by legal
means the power of the outside community to regulate the beliefs and associations
of students and faculty members. On the other hand, litigation as a means of settling
internal controversies, which occasionally arises, seems to have extremely limited
possibilities.
Academic freedom, however, is by no means wholly or even largely dependent on
formal protection for its strength and its survival. To a large extent it exists and is
recognized because of professional tradition and because it resides inherently in
the functions of teaching, learning, and research. Faculty members in colleges and
universities are usually not employed to follow orders but to render instruction
and to pursue inquiries in their fields of competence, largely free of supervision and
direction, even though there still are exceptions in some small institutions. For
students there is much more prescription; but election among an almost bewildering
array of course offerings and curricula is quite common. And surely the dominant
conception of the student in this country is that, within a given area of subject matter,
he is learning to exercise independent judgment and must have his reason appealed
to rather than dominated. Hence governing boards, administrative officers, faculty
members, students, and the public respect academic freedom almost insensibly; and
specific intrusions upon it are relatively rare, even though their absolute number
0 Faculty participation in college and university government appears to be increasing in the United
States. See Report of Committee on the Place and Function of Faculties in College and University Govern-
ment, 41 A.A.U.P. BuLL. 62 (1955).
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is considerable. Oath laws and similar attempts at control may have persistent
insidious effects, nevertheless, and need urgently to be eliminated.
Also badly needed is greater consciousness within the expanded academic com-
munity of the importance of academic freedom and of its exercise. The numerous
faculty members who are content to perform their specialized work in a manner
conducive to pleasant personal relations and to public inconspicuousness contribute
little to the ends for which freedom exists.7' For them and for the general public,
which can have the benefits of higher education only by maintaining the conditions
in which it grows, judicial formulation of the nature and requirements of academic
freedom, such as occasionally takes place in opinions, will (given the American
penchant for seeking wisdom from the courts) operate with salutary effect. For
the rest, progress is dependent on a developing "spirit of liberty" among academic
personnel and in the community at large.
1 1 PAuIL LAzAtSFELD & WAGNER TmELENS, JR., ThE AcADEMic MiND (1958), contains evidence that
even in areas of the colleges and universities where considerable independence might be expected a sig-
nificant portion of faculty members were led by the agitation of the early 595o's to temper their expressions
of opinion inside and outside of the classroom.
